Within sight of the White House on April 14, 1865, Lewis Powell attempted to assassinate Secretary of State William H. Seward after entering his home under the pretext of delivering medicine. That same night, a heavily intoxicated George Atzerodt stumbled and dropped a knife in the gutter, failing in his attempt to kill Vice President Andrew Johnson. Meanwhile, President Abraham Lincoln was gunned down by John Wilkes Booth while viewing a comedy at Ford’s Theatre.
The Lincoln assassination was the only successful hit carried out during a failed decapitation strike planned by a pro-Confederate cell in Washington. At this time, the Union had all but won the war and the conspirators planned to disrupt the U.S. government. They aimed to simultaneously murder Lincoln, Seward and Johnson in their homes. The hit on Lincoln succeeded, but the one on Seward failed and the one on Johnson was not even attempted, as the assassin nervously drank himself into a stupor. Their efforts were utterly fruitless.
Decapitation strikes, a tactic in which an actor attempts to neutralize one or multiple individuals in an enemy group’s leadership, have been increasingly common in international conflicts. This may mark a revolution in the way that enemy states interact with each other, but presents incredible risk as well.
The reason states seek to execute decapitations is that they seem to offer an easy method to critically hamstring an enemy’s power structure, demoralize their ranks and make any response impossible. However, it was not until very recently that such operations became practicable. The botched pro-Confederate plot of 1865 illustrates both of the principal reasons why.
First, there is the difficulty of executing multiple assassinations against high-ranking officials, and doing it within a short enough time frame that they cannot react. This is nearly impossible except for the remote chance that many of the targeted officials can be caught in the same room, such as when much of Hezbollah’s leadership was in Beirut in Sept. 2024. Second, there is no guarantee that the attack would have the desired effect on the power structure being targeted, as chains of command ensure continuity of leadership and most strong institutions can survive the losses of individual leaders.
But these strikes have showed up in modern warfare. On the night of June 13, 2025, 30 generals from both Iranian armed services, in addition to 9 of their key nuclear scientists, were assassinated in the opening minutes of the Iran-Israel War. The operation would have been impossible without years of intelligence collection to discern the exact locations of all 39 individuals, as well as the reckless indifference of the Iranians to the rapidly escalating regional tensions surrounding their nuclear program. In that respect, it was testament that decapitation strikes are still extremely difficult to carry out.
However, it also displayed that large-scale decapitation strikes are now possible. In other words, the first of the two issues was resolved as a result of previous decades’ leaps in communications, intelligence gathering and long-range offensive weaponry. Any power which has the resources to develop these means – far more countries than denizens of the great powers would like to admit – could theoretically inflict this kind of violence on their enemies. In the midst of an increasingly multipolar and violent world, this could characterize much about armed conflict in the future.
The United States got a crack at a similar operation, with similarly modest achieved objectives. On the early morning of Jan. 3, 2026, American special forces apprehended Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. It seems clear that the point of this operation was primarily power projection, especially given its framing as a law enforcement operation meant to fulfill the arrest warrant that the United States has had out for Maduro. The Venezuela operation was different from the Iran strike in two key respects: first, it was easier to execute because it only had a single target, and second, the political conditions surrounding the country made it possible to leverage more advantage in its aftermath.
Now that decapitation strikes are possible, what might the future of international conflicts look like? Given their inherent risk of fomenting instability, decapitation strikes may work most effectively when paired with the Powell Doctrine, a school of strategic thought that emphasizes defined and unchanging objectives and discourages overreach. As the United States learned in Iraq, smoothly removing a foreign dictatorship does not make a successful intervention. Both of last year’s successful decapitation strikes were carried out to assert regional power by putting the target countries down, but not out. In other words, strategists are learning that stirring momentary instability can create opportunities to achieve short-term objectives. This will likely prove the most intelligent way to use decapitations as a strategy.
However, world leaders are still likely to fear decapitation strikes – they, after all, are the targets. Reportedly, officials at the top of the Chinese government have been highly concerned about the possibility of an American decapitation since the Iran-Israel war. This poses both opportunity and danger. Depending on the rhetoric of American officials, it can serve as a deterrent against aggression on Taiwan, or it could motivate Beijing to escalate more rapidly in the event of an armed exchange. Most likely, the Chinese approach would be to threaten a nuclear strike to deter an American decapitation in the event of an act against Taiwan.
The risk lies in the possibility that the two sides’ signaling gets muddled and a catastrophic misreading takes place. This danger is not only an American issue. As middle powers throughout the world stretch to improve their defensive capabilities, more and more countries will be able to carry out decapitation strikes, and their rivals will have to consider similar ways to deter them from doing so. Here lies the irony – the operation much vaunted for its supposed utility in achieving substantial defensive gains with minimal destruction may, with its mere plausibility, make the world a much more dangerous place.
